Download Evolution of Non-Expected Utility Preferences by Sven von Widekind PDF

By Sven von Widekind

The conception at the evolution of personal tastes offers with the endogenous formation of choice relatives in strategic events. it truly is relating to the sector of evolutionary online game thought. versions are according to the 'indirect evolutionary strategy' based on which personal tastes ensure selection habit which in flip determines evolutionary luck. The latter ultimately governs the evolution of personal tastes. Literature often considers a category of personal tastes which admit an anticipated application illustration.

In this publication we study the position and the impression of basic, probably non-expected application personal tastes in such an evolutionary setup. particularly, we reveal that personal tastes which diverge from von Neumann-Morgenstern anticipated software may perhaps almost certainly turn out to achieve success below evolutionary pressures. moreover, we give a contribution to the learn into lifestyles matters for so-called good populations. particularly, we exhibit that this type of strong inhabitants exists for any specification of the health values.

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Extra info for Evolution of Non-Expected Utility Preferences

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More formally, no type that has an expected utility representation can occur in the support of a stable population if A is not efficient unless b equals c. These are exactly the cases in which [14] does not have existence of a stable pair. Thus, the latter work already demonstrates that populations consisting solely of expected utility types can always be successfully invaded by mutants. We show that, above all, expected utility maximizers cannot co-exist along with other types. No population composed of expected and non-expected utility types can ever be stable if the fitness values are as described above.

Formally, let µ be a stable population. 75 = π ∗ ≥ 5 σ = σT (10 − 15 σ ¯e ) + 5 σ ¯e . 75−5 if σe < 23   10−15 σ¯e  [0,1] if σe = 23 . 8) In order to further characterize the set of stable populations, we investigate the cases in which an entrant-type agent obtain an expected fitness of exactly π ∗ from a match with an incumbent agent. 75−5 10−15 σe , σe = 3 . 7) can never occur when σe is equal to 23 as this is not an efficient strategy. 9) = σT (5 − 15 σ ¯e ) + 10 σ ¯e . 10) defined for x ∈ [0, 1] \ { 23 }, has a double null at x = 12 , no other null, a strictly positive value at x = 1 and a strictly negative value at x = 0 (due to a vertical asymptote at x = 23 ).

2. 6). t. π and that we have b = c. t. π, then C(µ) solely contains types T ∈ T with best-response correspondences that satisfy σ ∗ ∈ βT (σ ∗ ) and for which we have i. if b > c ≥ π ∗ :  π ∗ −d−σ(b−d) 0, σ(a+d−b−c)+c−d       [0, 1] βT (σ) ⊆  [σ ∗ , 1]      π∗ −d−σ(b−d) σ(a+d−b−c)+c−d , 1 ii. 3 An Anti-Coordination Game iii. if c > b ≥ π ∗ :  π ∗ −d−σ(b−d) 0, σ(a+d−b−c)+c−d       [0, σ ∗ ] βT (σ) ⊆  [0, 1]     ∗  π −d−σ(b−d) σ(a+d−b−c)+c−d , 1 if 0 ≤ σ ≤ c−π ∗ c−a , 41 σ = σ∗ if σ = σ ∗ iv.

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