By Gary W. Cox
The superb Court's reapportionment judgements, starting with Baker v. Carr in 1962, had excess of jurisprudential outcomes. They sparked a tremendous wave of remarkable redistricting within the mid-1960s. either country legislative and congressional districts have been redrawn extra comprehensively--by far--than at any past time in our nation's historical past. in addition, they replaced what could legally ensue should still a kingdom govt fail to enact a brand new districting plan while one was once legally required. This ebook presents the 1st particular research of ways judicial partisanship affected redistricting results within the Sixties, arguing that the reapportionment revolution led in a roundabout way to 3 basic adjustments within the nature of congressional elections: the abrupt eradication of a 6% pro-Republican bias within the translation of congressional votes into seats outdoor the south; the abrupt elevate within the obvious benefit of incumbents; and the abrupt alteration of the 2 events' luck in congressional recruitment and elections.
Read Online or Download Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) PDF
Similar elections books
A important tale of up to date southern politics is the emergence of Republican majorities within the region’s congressional delegation. Acknowledging the importance and scope of the political swap, James M. Glaser argues that, however, strands of continuity have an effect on the perform of crusade politics in vital methods.
Even supposing there's a common trust that asymmetric voter turnout results in biased results in American democracy, current empirical assessments have stumbled on few results. via providing a scientific account of ways and the place turnout issues in neighborhood politics, this publication demanding situations a lot of what we all know approximately turnout in the USA this present day.
Why do humans residing in several components vote in several methods? Why does this variation over the years? How do humans discuss politics with acquaintances and neighbours, and with what impression? Does the geography of wellbeing and fitness impact the geography of social gathering aid? Do events attempt to check with all electorate at election time, or are they simply within the perspectives of a small variety of citizens residing in a small variety of seats?
During this moment version to a booklet that has now accomplished canonical prestige, David R. Mayhew argues that the crucial motivation of legislators is reelection and that the pursuit of this aim impacts the best way they behave and how that they make public coverage. In a brand new foreword for this version, R. Douglas Arnold discusses why the booklet revolutionized the research of Congress and the way it has stood the try out of time.
- New Media and American Politics (Transforming American Politics)
- The Nightly News Nightmare: Media Coverage of U.S. Presidential Elections, 1988-2008
- Armageddon: How Trump Can Beat Hillary
- Evaluation and Optimization of Electoral Systems (Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications)
- Democratic Elections in Poland, 1991-2007
- Image Bite Politics: News and the Visual Framing of Elections (Series in Political Psychology)
Extra info for Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
First, the category of mixed plans includes all those written under divided government in the face of an automatic conservative reversion. 1. Predictions for Bias and Responsiveness as a Function of Government Control and Legal Reversion Automatic Conservative Reversion Automatic Radical Reversion Unified Control of State Government Partisan Plan: High Bias and High Responsiveness Partisan Plan: High Bias and High Responsiveness Divided Control of State Government Mixed Plan: High Bias and Low Responsiveness Bipartisan Plan: Low Bias and Low Responsiveness 42 A Model of Congressional Redistricting assume that the strong party is also the party that benefits under the reversion, thus excluding the somewhat different case in which the weak party benefits under the reversion.
Under unified control with automatic reversion, we expect partisan gerrymanders, yielding high levels of both partisan bias and responsiveness. Under divided control with automatic radical reversion, we expect bipartisan incumbent-protecting gerrymanders, yielding lower levels of both partisan bias and responsiveness (the bias favoring the party with the larger expected vote share). Finally, under divided control with automatic conservative reversion, we expect higher levels of bias but lower levels of responsiveness – a mixed case that has features of both partisan and bipartisan gerrymanders.
His primary emphasis is instead on the partisan nature of malapportionment in each state: “the partisan advantage bestowed by post-1964 [redistricting] schemes has come to depend more on which party’s districts before redistricting were relatively underpopulated and less on the identity of the party drawing the lines” (Born 1985, p. 317). , Bullock 1975; Abramowitz 1983; Cain 1985; Glazer, Grofman, and Robbins 1987; Niemi and Winsky 1987; Campagna and Grofman 1990). The view now prevailing in the literature is that redistricting is unlikely to produce any net partisan gains at the national level because (1) partisan gerrymanders occur only when one party controls both the legislative and executive branches in a state, making them relatively rare given the high incidence of divided government in the states;6 (2) partisan gerrymanders sometimes fail; and (3) 6 Even when one party controls the policy-making apparatus, partisan gerrymanders are less likely to occur if the in party has no reason to fear the out party and is factionalized (as in one-party areas of the country).