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Additional info for Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment (National Bureau of Economic Research Project Report)
Since these default risks are, in practice, correlated across borrowers, the law of large numbers does not effectively eliminate the total risk facing even large banks. 28. Note that this represents a departure from the perfectly informed, risk-neutral lenders of sec. 1. However, accommodating such behavior does not fundamentally alter the characteristics of the firm-level model. 29. Formally, . dr lIm -!.. rf-r m dr~ ~ 0 dr , ~ dr~ < 0 , for r~ < rm • 40 Bruce C. Greenwald/Joseph E. Stiglitz 30.
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